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Two-thirds of the world’s population, 5.1 billion people, lack meaningful access to justice.1 
According to a recent report, the burden of global injustice reflects and perpetuates existing inter- 
and intra-national inequalities, falling most heavily on those who can least afford to bear this 
burden. While the cost of injustice has 5.1 billion individual faces – people who are not able to, 
for example, adequately address personal or professional disputes, access public services, or exit 
situations of extreme injustice and exploitation such as modern slavery – it also includes 
aggregated costs of reduced GDP and increased global conflict. Access to justice for all is a critical 
component of global sustainable development, and is embodied in SDG 16 and its targets. 
 
In many cases, injustices may be caused or perpetuated by business activity. In 2011, the United 
Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (the “UNGPs”) were endorsed by the 
UN Human Rights Council to articulate the international responsibility of business enterprises to 
respect human rights, building on states’ existing obligations under international law to respect, 
protect, and fulfill human rights and fundamental freedoms. Appropriate and effective remedies 
must be provided and accessible when human rights abuses have occurred; these may include 
recourse to judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.  
 
Yet, injustice persists. It is glaringly clear that many existing dispute settlement mechanisms, 
individually or in combination, are inadequate, in design or application, to advancing effective 
remedies, particularly in the context of transnational disputes related to business activity. This is 
deeply troubling. In response, The Business and Human Rights Arbitration Working Group (the 
“BHR Arbitration Working Group”), a group of respected practicing lawyers and academics, is 
advancing international arbitration as a mechanism to help address the remedy gap. With the 
perspective that “international arbitration holds great promise as a method to be used to resolve 
human rights disputes involving business,” the BHR Arbitration Working Group is working to 
produce The Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration (the “BHR Arbitration 
Rules”), and has released a draft of those Rules for consultation; final rules are expected by the 
end of the calendar year.  
 
We are deeply supportive of efforts to increase rights holders’ avenues for remedy when they have 
been harmed. We recognize the need for more mechanisms, including non-judicial mechanisms, 
to open up access to justice. We admire creative solutions to tough problems, and concrete efforts 
to advance the “all roads to remedy” approach articulated by the UN Working Group on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises.2 We are concerned, 
however, as summarized in an accompanying blog post available here, that the BHR Arbitration 
Rules Project is not clearly and consistently focused on the access-to-remedy problem it is 
attempting to solve. Moreover, the Project does not yet adequately address the risk that arbitration 
may in some cases thwart, rather than advance, access to justice. As a consequence, the Project 
may ultimately do more harm than good to its aim of increasing access to justice. We urge more 
work to ensure that arbitration cannot be used to narrow paths to relief, and suggest that additional 
work with potential claimant rights holders would help in refining the rules so that they are fit for 
purpose.  
 
                                                 
1 Task Force on Justice, Justice For All – Final Report (New York, Center on International Cooperation, 2019). 
2 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, UN Doc. A/72/162, July 18, 2017.  
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In this briefing note, we discuss several outstanding issues and suggest ways forward, focusing 
solely on rights holder-company claims, rather than the business-to-business disputes envisioned 
as also being handled under the Rules. We begin by articulating a key component of the access to 
remedy problem – legal rules and systems erected and defended by companies to limit claims and 
liability – and why and how that element needs to be addressed by the BHR Arbitration Project. 
We then identify a number of contributions that the BHR Arbitration Project could usefully 
provide to make arbitration a fair mechanism for advancing claims, and highlight some areas where 
we see the current Rules as falling short. We conclude with a broader set of recommendations 
about strategies and processes for improving access to justice for victims of business-related 
human rights abuses.   
Identifying the Problem: Companies don’t want to be sued 
 
The Draft BHR Arbitration Rules state in their Commentary that the rules aim to “provide a means 
for access to remedy for rights holders affected by business activity.”3 Improving means of access 
is crucial, as individuals face persistent legal and practical barriers when trying to bring claims 
against corporations for alleged human rights abuses. In some contexts, domestic legal systems of 
the country where the harm occurred struggle to provide functioning, well-resourced, and 
accessible courts. In many cases, there are significant legal and practical hurdles to accessing 
justice in the home jurisdiction(s) of the corporate entity. However, the challenges victims of 
human rights abuse face in securing relief in courts can be partly attributed to the barriers that 
companies themselves have fought for and defended.4 These limits include those arising from 
doctrines of forum non conveniens, legal rules restricting which entities in the corporate group can 
be sued for what and where, norms shielding parent companies from liability for conduct of their 
subsidiaries, and legal tools companies can use to move assets across borders and across legal 
entities to shield them from execution.5  
 
                                                 
3 Commentary at 3.  
4 In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, for instance, dozens of companies and industry associations filed briefs in 
support of Shell Petroleum and its fellow corporate respondents, arguing against US courts’ jurisdiction over claims 
regarding human rights violations suffered abroad. The briefs broadly framed the issues being considered, arguing 
that the US Supreme Court should use the opportunity to hold that US courts categorically lack jurisdiction over 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims relating to human rights abuses abroad, and also that the ATS does not permit 
claims against corporations. These amicus briefs, filed on February 3, 2012, and August 8, 2012, are available at 
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petroleum/. See also John Ruggie, “Kiobel and 
Corporate Social Responsibility,” Harvard Kennedy School of Government (September 4, 2012) (raising questions 
about Shell’s arguments and their consistency with the company’s human rights responsibilities); Lyle Denniston, 
“Argument Preview: Will an Old Law Shrink,” Scotusblog.com, September 27, 2012, available at 
https://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/argument-preview-will-an-old-law-shrink/ (accessed August 20, 2019) 
(providing an overview of the arguments). See also Daimler AG v. Bauman, and briefs filed in that case by 
petitioner Daimler AG and other firms and industry associations, available at https://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/daimlerchrysler-ag-v-bauman/. 
5 These and other barriers are described, e.g., in Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial 
Remedies for Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) 
World, 46 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS. L. REV. 158, 234-36 (2014); Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale, and 
Olivier De Schutter, The Third Pillar: Access to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational 
Business (2013), 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/583f3fca725e25fcd45aa446/t/58657dfa6a4963597fed598b/1483046398204/Th
e-Third-Pillar-FINAL1.pdf (accessed August 20, 2019).  
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The BHR Arbitration Project may help claimants avoid the impact of some of these limitations in 
the near term – especially the impacts of weak or corrupt courts – but only if and to the extent that 
companies agree to having claims brought against them in arbitration. In other words, the BHR 
Arbitration Project relies on the notion that companies will consent to arbitration notwithstanding 
their fights against claims in other contexts.6 This raises the following question: If multinational 
corporations are fighting jurisdiction (and liability where jurisdiction lies) in host countries, home 
countries, and elsewhere for human rights abuses, why would such companies consent to arbitrate 
those disputes? And if they do, is there reason for skepticism as to what would motivate this 
agreement when the same company raises forum non conveniens, corporate-form-related 
objections, or similar arguments erecting jurisdictional barriers elsewhere? What conditions might 
the agreement to arbitrate contain to nullify or reduce claimants’ chances for success or potential 
remedies?7 What aspects of arbitration make it more appealing to defendant companies than 
dispute resolution in courts, and are those aspects likely to be more or less favorable towards 
potential claimants? 
 
Perhaps, as the BHR Arbitration Project assumes, companies will in fact consent to arbitrate 
disputes they would have otherwise fought in other forums on jurisdictional or similar grounds, 
opening up paths to justice that companies (and legal systems) had otherwise closed. But, it must 
be recognized that a decision by a company to agree to arbitration will likely be made based on an 
assessment that consent to defend in that forum (1) has cost or other financial (including 
reputational and liability-related) benefits that other fora do not, and (2) will be accompanied by 
efforts by respondent/defendants to limit the choice of forum for claimants or to preclude related 
claims by other non-party claimants.8 Thus, arbitration will be agreed to when it has advantages 
for the corporate defendant. The flipside is that, for victim claimants, arbitration may pose risks 
that litigation in other forums does not. Prospective claimants may not be aware of these benefits 
to companies, and risks to claimants, when they agree to arbitrate. 
 
While the company’s openness or commitment to suit in a neutral forum may seem advantageous 
for potential claimants in search of a place for their claims to be heard and remedies secured, there 
are aspects, costs, and implications of arbitration that potential victims may not be aware of, 
                                                 
6 The BHR Arbitration Project also suggests that states may compel human rights claims to be pursued using these 
rules, although it is unclear whether that would be through mandates requiring potential claimants to pursue this 
path, potential defendants/respondents to consent, or both; and it is similarly unclear how such a mandate would be 
put in place. See Commentary at 3 (“It is also worth noting that for States, the encouragement, facilitation or even 
prescription to use business and human rights arbitration would also constitute an additional tool for them to fulfill 
their responsibilities under UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights Pillars I and III.”). 
7 Arbitration agreements can include myriad provisions that can impact the costs of the disputes for plaintiffs, their 
chances of success, the remedies available, the likelihood of obtaining remedies, and the likelihood of and paths to 
enforcement. These include provisions waiving (or agreeing to) class claims, as well as provisions on: venue of 
hearings; the legal seat; the language of the arbitration; who is entitled to bring claims against whom and for what; 
the applicable law; the scope of discovery; and the powers and duties of the arbitrators. 
8 Regarding why companies prefer arbitration in the US context, see also Stephen Ware, Paying the Price of 
Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90-91 (2001) 
(identifying the following factors: it eliminates juries and is assumed to reduce the threat of large damages awards 
that may be associated with them; arbitration’s relatively more confidential nature lessens the risk of adverse 
publicity; it simplifies and standardizes procedures; the awards are more final and save companies the costs of 
appeals; arbitration can limit or eliminate the possibility of class actions; it can deter claims through requiring 
claimants to pay the fees of arbitrators and arbitral institutions; and it can reduce the amount of discovery plaintiffs 
can get, reducing time and expense and making it more difficult for claimants to prove their claims).  
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particularly if they are asked to consent to arbitration prior to a dispute taking place. If claimants 
are forced to arbitrate to the exclusion of other avenues, the fees that must be paid and the rules 
employed may make claims infeasible9 and recovery particularly unlikely. This risk is heightened 
if claimants make that election prior to a dispute arising. If, for instance, individual claims are of 
limited financial value as compared to the cost of arbitration (e.g., claims for back-wages in host 
countries where salaries are low, but the counsel, experts, and arbitrators required to effectively 
participate are charging fees based on developed-country market prices10), then the cases may not 
be worth the cost of pursuit.11 
 
To effectively serve the needs of potential victim claimants as the BHR Arbitration Working 
Group aims to do, these issues must be identified and addressed head-on. The work must be more 
direct about the motives, opportunities, and challenges of arbitration, and the implications of the 
varied procedural forms it can take. Otherwise, the BHR Arbitration Rules risk giving companies 
a “greenwashing” tool they can use to misleadingly advertise their willingness to be held 
accountable for harms they cause. Companies may stipulate in agreements such as employment 
contracts, user agreements for infrastructure or public services, or community-investor agreements 
                                                 
9 E.g., because of costs of even initiating arbitration, which are greater than for courts. This could especially 
dissuade people from bringing claims for relatively small sums (such as back-wages due for low-paying work, slight 
but routine overcharges on bills, or reimbursement of rent paid on uninhabitable buildings). These issues could be 
overcome through class or collective claims, but such claims may be barred through express class action 
prohibitions in arbitration agreements, or doctrines interpreting silence regarding the permissibility of class actions 
to mean a bar on such types of claims. See, e.g., DIRECTTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S.Ct. 463 (2015), (Ginsburg, J., 
and Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also David H. Webber, Shareholder Litigation without Class Actions, 57 ARIZ. 
L.REV. 201 (2015) (discussing implications of legal rules making class actions in securities claims less 
feasible/attractive).  
10 Indeed, while the Bangladesh Accord set an important precedent in terms of multinational firms’ willingness to 
sign onto legally-binding agreements enforceable through arbitration, critiques have been raised about the costs and 
complexity of the process. As reported by one of the complainants in two arbitration cases under the Accord: 
 
Initial arguments centered on admissibility (whether the cases could be heard), choice of law (which 
country’s law should govern the dispute) and procedural matters such as document production. This turned 
out to be a very heavy and costly process. As no agreement could be reached on a single arbitrator to hear 
the cases, under the UNCITRAL Rules they went before a panel of three arbitrators, one chosen by the 
plaintiffs (the global unions), one chosen by the brands and a chair appointed by the PCA. The global 
unions were required to deposit €150,000 with the PCA to cover the fees and travel of the three arbitrators 
and the administrative costs of the PCA [for the two cases].  
 
Jenny Holdcroft, Feature: Supply Chain Justice through Binding Global Agreements (Industriall, January 15, 2019), 
available at http://www.industriall-union.org/feature-supply-chain-justice-through-binding-global-agreements 
(accessed August 20, 2019).  
 
The outcome of one of those two cases is confidential. In the other, the parties settled when the company agreed to 
pay USD2 million toward remediation of more than 150 factories and to contribute an additional USD300,000 to 
support the work of the global unions improving pay and conditions for workers in global supply chains. The author 
concludes, “These outcomes show how important it is for global unions to be able to make binding agreements with 
MNCs that they can subsequently enforce. But the experience also demonstrated the limitations of using existing 
mechanisms of international arbitration which are neither designed nor suitable for the settlement of industrial 
disputes.” Id.  
11 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In California's 
perfectly rational view, nonclass arbitration over such [small] sums will also sometimes have the effect of depriving 
claimants of their claims . . . .”); see also Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).  
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relating to natural resource projects, that any or all disputes between the contracting parties will 
be resolved pursuant to arbitration under the BHR Arbitration Rules. One could view these types 
of pronouncements and commitments as important ex ante agreements to be judged but one could 
also view them more skeptically as arrangements enabling companies to ensure they are only 
judged in accordance with the rules and in the fora that they have agreed to, and that operate in 
their favor. In short, while the BHR Arbitration Rules may help companies give the appearance of 
overcoming their resistance to suit, and the “BHR” label may encourage potential claimants to 
agree to them, BHR arbitration does not necessarily ameliorate access to justice problems and may 
in fact, exacerbate them, individually or systemically.12 Some relevant issues are discussed further 
below. 
Presenting a Fuller View of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration, and Options for 
Rights Holders 
 
State-based13 litigation and systems of remedy, unquestionably, have flaws and may not be what 
the disputing parties need or want. Thus, it is useful to explore complementary mechanisms for 
relief, including arbitration. Unfortunately, however, arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism 
has the potential to privilege the powerful and well-resourced over less well-equipped parties. 
Scholars have raised various concerns, including that arbitration undermines substantive rights,14 
and creates relatively unchecked potential for abuse,15 and that the risks of harm fall 
                                                 
12 See Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for Violations of International 
Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 
158, 181 (2014). 
13 As is well known, the state also plays a role in arbitration, e.g., enforcing agreements to arbitrate and enforcing 
awards. Without such state support, arbitration would be limited in terms of its utility, efficiency, and effectiveness. 
Thus, arbitration does not mean an absence of the state. (See also Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018)). But by “state-based” we mean court systems. Diane Desierto suggests our critique of 
BHR arbitration is based on a view of arbitration as somehow providing “inauthentic” access to justice since it is not 
provided by the state. But, as reflected in this piece and in our previous comments to the Working Group’s work, 
that is not our concern. See Diane Desierto, “Why Arbitrate Business and Human Rights Disputes? Public 
Consultation Period Open for the Draft Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration” EJIL: Talk! (July 
12, 2019) < https://www.ejiltalk.org/public-consultation-period-until-august-25-for-the-draft-hague-rules-on-
business-and-human-rights-arbitration/>; CCSI, Submission to the Drafting Team of the Hague Rules on Business 
and Human Rights Arbitration (January 31, 2019) < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/02/21/business-and-human-
rights-arbitration/>.  
14 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of 
Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015);  
15 The abuse can be abuse of power by the other party or parties to the arbitration, or abuse by the arbitrator. In this 
context, laws governing judicial review of the enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards can help prevent 
or remedy a number of potentially abusive scenarios, such as enforcement of arbitration agreements that are 
unconscionable, that require arbitration in places costly and relatively inaccessible to claimants, or that structure 
procedural rules so as to effectively preclude success. See, e.g, Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 
COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018) (noting ways courts can play a greater role in preventing or addressing abuse in 
arbitration so as to ensure the state is not complicit in such abuse); Arpan A. Sura and Robert A. DeRise, 
Conceptualizing Conception: The Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403 (2013) 
(outlining how such aspects of arbitration agreements may or may not be regulated by different layers of domestic 
law (and judicial interpretations thereof)). The abuse may also be due to the conduct of the arbitrator. While awards 
may be set aside or vacated due to characteristics or conduct of the arbitrator, review of the arbitrators’ errors of 
facts or law is generally limited. Furthermore, and potentially reducing incentives on arbitrators and associated 
actors to perform their roles diligently, Article 16 of the BHR Arbitration Rules states, “Save for intentional 
wrongdoing, the parties waive, to the fullest extent permitted under the applicable law, any claim against the 
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disproportionately on the weaker party.16 These critiques do not necessarily mean that arbitration 
should be avoided for complaints against companies relating to human rights abuses, but they do 
demonstrate the care that should be taken upfront when advocating a greater role for arbitration 
and particular Rules for resolving these kinds of disputes. This provides an important opportunity 
for the BHR Arbitration Project, which could do a number of things to further identify and address 
such issues, thereby helping to craft a legal system that addresses longstanding remedy gaps. 
 
Developing annotated texts of options 
 
In addition to the careful development of the arbitration rules themselves, to ensure that the use of 
the rules levels, rather than further tilts, playing fields,17 the BHR Arbitration Project could also 
help claimants understand the rules (and, as discussed briefly below, the broader systems in which 
they sit, including domestic arbitration laws and international conventions on enforcement) to 
make more informed choices when the rules are used. As compared to litigation, arbitration 
generally contains more gaps that can or must be filled by agreement of the parties or by a decision 
of the tribunal, such as regards the arbitral seat, approaches to fee-shifting, applicable law, and the 
rules governing potentially outcome-determinative issues relating to burdens of proof, evidence, 
disclosure, discovery, and third party participation. From an access to justice perspective, an 
annotated guide that explains to potential claimants alleging rights violations the various issues to 
be agreed upon, the associated options available, and the implication of those options (e.g. 
companies may seek X in this context, which could have Y and Z outcomes) would go some way 
towards advancing equality of arms. While it might not fully level the playing field, a guide could 
at least help claimants identify how to use arbitration to enable claims that state-based procedural 
rules and evidentiary doctrines might otherwise foreclose.  
 
Developing rules with claimants in mind 
 
Rights holders’ access to justice challenges are broad and well-documented, and arise from a 
diverse set of often-related factors relevant in litigation and arbitration contexts. These include the 
(1) legal costs associated with pursuing claims (on an absolute basis and relative to the monetary 
                                                 
arbitrators, the appointing authority and any person appointed by the arbitral tribunal based on any act or omission in 
connection with the arbitration.” This is taken from the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Although it is important to 
ensure decisionmakers are not susceptible to undue pressure that might threaten their independence and neutrality, 
this narrowing of accountability for arbitrators, appointing authorities, and others for any conduct “in connection 
with the arbitration”, is not necessarily an optimal rule for BHR Arbitration.   
16 See, e.g.,; Pat K. Chew, Twenty Years after the 1991 Civil Rights Act: What Does the Future Hold?: Arbitral and 
Judicial Proceedings: Indistinguishable Justice or Justice Denied, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 185, 204 (2011) 
(finding that plaintiffs in racial harassment arbitrations seemed to have a lower rate of success than plaintiffs in 
racial harassment cases brought before courts); J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case 
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1 (2011) (comparing employee success rates in employment 
arbitration v employment litigation, and finding lower success rates in arbitration; success also seemed tied to 
employers’ repeat player status, and their re-appointment of the same arbitrator); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness 
and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1400 
(1985).  
17 See, e.g., See, e.g, Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (2018) (discussing some 
of the ways that arbitration laws (or interpretations thereof) can be designed to limit the potential for harm or use of 
arbitration in ways that offends public values); Arpan A. Sura and Robert A. DeRise, Conceptualizing Conception: 
The Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403 (2013) (same).  
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value of the claims), (2) technical expertise needed to pursue cases, (3) substantive and procedural 
rules making success difficult or impossible, (5) challenges in accessing information necessary to 
prevail; and (6) risks associated with bringing claims, including potential financial or legal 
liability. In light of these issues, the Project could have usefully designed rules that specifically 
help victim claimants overcome those challenges. While companies may resist or try to change 
provisions they consider favorable to claimants, rules designed in the claimants’ interests could at 
least help support claimants in their engagement with respondent parties who seek to modify or 
fill gaps in otherwise applicable arbitration rules. Optimal rules for claimants, with explanatory 
text to illuminate their implications, could reduce the time (and money) spent in individual cases 
crafting and agreeing on provisions dealing with complex issues, such as the appropriateness of 
and rules governing mass claims, particularly as victim claimants may struggle to afford high-
priced legal counsel experienced in arbitration.18   
 
At present, however, the BHR Arbitration Rules are not drafted from a rights holder-claimant’s 
perspective, and indeed leave potential claimants unduly exposed to a system that can undermine 
their rights. The Rules’ default position on costs, for instance, would have unsuccessful (which 
may include partially successful) claimants bear their and the defendant company’s legal costs, a 
possibility that would likely deter legitimate claims, especially if defendant companies are 
expected to employ high-priced legal counsel.19 The tribunal is given discretion to modify that 
cost-shifting rule, but there is no ex ante certainty regarding whether and how such discretion 
would be applied, nor a clear mechanism for effectively challenging those decisions. Additionally, 
with respect to class actions, the Rules aim to “set aside the presumption that exists in certain 
jurisdictions whereby an agreement to arbitrate is construed as a waiver of the right to proceed 
with a class, mass, collective or multi-party action in any forum.” But the Rules do not make clear 
that class claims are allowed, even where they would be in relevant domestic fora.20 Rather, they 
leave to the tribunal’s discretion whether such claims will be allowed. A victim-centered set of 
rules should at least provide claimants the same rights to bring claims as they would have under 
domestic law, not less.  
 
                                                 
18 Some may argue that if BHR Arbitration were available, claimants could secure experienced legal support, 
including support from NGOs focused on impact litigation, to help them with their cases. While this may be true, 
there are reasons to suspect that it will be harder for resource-strained NGOs to make the case that they should 
pursue claims in arbitration than through courts, particularly as the “impact” of a successful outcome in arbitration 
may have less of a systemic value than one in an open court proceeding. On challenges facing rights holders affected 
by land-based investments in accessing legal and technical support, see CCSI, Addressing Legal Support Gaps 
Around Land-Based Investment < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/addressing-legal-support-gaps-around-
land-based-investment/> accessed August 30, 2019.  
19 See, e.g., Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (recognizing that a cost-shifting provision 
in an arbitration agreement could render it unenforceable, but reversing the Court of Appeals determination that 
silence with respect to costs and fees was unenforceable); see also, Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., 293 P.3d 1197, 
1200-1201 (Wash. 2013) (finding a “loser-pays” provision to be substantively unconscionable). Other approaches 
that take account of the impact of fee-shifting statutes, and that aim to address them and improve access to justice 
for poorer litigants are possible. See, e.g., Issacher Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 717 (2010) 
(arguing for a one-way fee shifting rule under which courts would award attorneys’ fees to winners when those 
winners are poor litigants prevailing against more moneyed opponents, and under which each side would bear its 
own costs when the rich party prevails).  
20 Commentary to Article 17, p. 24.  
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Another area where the Rules seem notably unfavorable towards victims is the provision expressly 
incorporating the doctrine of separability,21 which calls on arbitrators to enforce an agreement to 
arbitrate even where the contract in which that arbitration agreement forms a part would be void 
or unenforceable. This provision would potentially have tribunals close their eyes to circumstances 
in which the agreement to arbitrate between a firm and victim claimants was secured through 
duress, fraud, or misrepresentation by the company, an outcome particularly disconcerting in a 
context where the would-be claimants are often vulnerable to abuse. 
 
The Rules’ provisions on early dismissal of claims lacking legal or factual merit,22 which the 
Commentary notes were inserted so as to respond to the business community’s concerns,23 also 
skew the dispute settlement system against rights-holder claimants. The vagueness of such 
provisions – including the lack of clarity regarding the standards for granting such motions, 
relevant burdens of production and proof, available discovery, and relevant rules of evidence – 
makes it exceedingly difficult for claimants to know whether this provision will make it more or 
less likely that their claims will survive in arbitration as compared to litigation. Although the 
Commentary recognizes and directs the tribunal to anticipate and address some of the ways this 
rule could disadvantage already disadvantaged claimants, that guidance is not clearly reflected in 
the Rules themselves, and will have uncertain effect in shaping actual tribunal decisions.24  
 
A further issue relates to the Rules’ provisions on counterclaims, orders of interim relief, and 
penalties for non-compliance with orders for interim measures.25 While the reasoning behind 
permitting such actions is rational, if such provisions are not accompanied by appropriate 
protections, they could be improperly used to intimidate plaintiffs into dropping their claims, and 
to pressure or order plaintiffs to halt other actions such as protests, strikes, or publicity 
campaigns.26 A frivolous counterclaim by a defendant company, for example, might be designed 
to intimidate rights holder claimants. To avoid such scenarios, the BHR Arbitration Rules could 
take guidance from “anti-SLAPP” rules that seek to limit the use of domestic litigation for abusive 
and retaliatory purposes and to protect the rights of public protest and lawsuits against enterprises 
or other powerful parties.27 Currently, the BHR Arbitration Rules, including the tribunal’s broad 
power to order sanctions for non-compliance with orders of interim measures, may exacerbate the 
                                                 
21 Article 23(1). 
22 Article 23-bis. 
23 Commentary to Article 23-bis. 
24 Commentary to Article 23-bis.  
25 Article 21(3)(counterclaims); Article 26 (interim measures). 
26 Article 26(1) states that an “arbitral tribunal may, at the request of a party, stipulate any monetary penalty it deems 
appropriate for non-compliance with its interim measures” 
27 The term “SLAPP” suits refers to a “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation,” which may be generally 
defined as actions brought by businesses or other powerful actors to stifle the exercise of free speech and prevent 
plaintiffs from petitioning the government for redress. SLAPP suits are one means used by companies to combat 
claims against them relating to human rights abuses and other harms. To prevent and/or remedy the effects of 
SLAPP suits, some jurisdictions have adopted anti-SLAPP laws. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16; NY Civil 
Rights Law §§70-a, See also Tyler J. Kimberly, Note, A SLAPP Back on Track: How Shady Grove Prevents the 
Application of Anti-SLAPP Laws in Federal Courts, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1201 (2015) (discussing how state 
anti-SLAPP laws differ from federal procedural rules regarding dismissal of meritless claims). For relevance in 
human rights context, see also Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-Kiobel) World, 46 
COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS. L. REV. 158, 234-36 (2014). 
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chilling effects of retaliatory company actions; they could be amended, however, to include rules 
or mechanisms that deter and/or penalize such actions.28 
 
More broadly, while there are provisions in the Rules that aim to combat asymmetries in legal 
knowledge, resources, and power, they are vague and of potentially limited effect. Article 5(2), in 
particular, provides three criteria that must be satisfied before a tribunal is called upon to take 
affirmative action to ensure fairness, and even then the tribunal’s duty is to “endeavor” to ensure 
fairness, not to actually ensure it.29  
 
Similarly, there is little in the Rules to help ensure that arbitrations will not be cost prohibitive to 
pursue. Commentary to the Rules states that “the arbitral tribunal should pay particular attention 
to how to enhance access and reduce costs through the use of multiple languages, translation and 
interpretation, while at the same time resorting to such tools only where needed in order not to 
increase costs unduly.”30 But the Rules themselves do not provide that instruction; and there are 
no similar dictates in the Rules governing other issues that can similarly have significant cost and 
access implications, such as the location of hearings. Without more, it is uncertain whether 
tribunals will feel empowered or inclined to take appropriate proactive measures to adequately 
remedy power asymmetries between disputing parties.31  
 
Addressing arbitration’s legal infrastructure – contracts, laws, and conventions 
 
Additionally, the Project could examine whether and to what extent provisions in arbitration 
agreements, model and actual laws on arbitration, and conventions on enforcement are appropriate 
for the BHR context, and explore whether and what changes to those arbitration-related 
instruments would help close remedy gaps and prevent abuses. Regarding the contents of 
arbitration agreements, the Project could further elaborate on options for and implications of 
different “applicable law” clauses governing both substantive matters of rights and obligations, as 
well as the law governing interpretation of the contract and arbitration agreement. Relatedly, the 
                                                 
28 Although the Rules contain a provision regarding dismissal of meritless claims (including counterclaims), these 
are not necessarily the same as anti-SLAPP actions. The latter are sometimes accompanied by timelines, burdens of 
proof, and specific penalties, that are not applicable to other preliminary motions to dismiss. Even where anti-
SLAPP laws are in force domestically, it is not clear that they will protect victim claimants’ arbitration claims from 
counterclaims pursued in arbitration. See, e.g., Sheppad v. Lightpost Museum Fund, 146 Cal. App. 4th 315 (2006) 
(holding that California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to alleged SLAPP claims pursued in arbitration); but 
see Pat Murphy, Anti-SLAPP Protection Applies to FINRA Arbitration, Mass. Lawyers Weekly, July 10, 2018 
(holding that the state’s anti-SLAPP statute applied to protect a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) 
arbitration, given the relationship between FINRA and the government).  
29 “Where a party is unrepresented and has limited financial resources and legal knowledge, the arbitral tribunal shall 
endeavor, without compromising its independence and impartiality, to ensure that the unrepresented party is given an 
effective opportunity to present its case in fair and efficient proceedings.” Article 5(2). In addition, any “special 
treatment” of less well-resourced or equipped litigants may also run afoul of Article 17.  
30 Commentary to Article 19, p. 27. 
31 Cf Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, UN Doc. A/72/162, July 18, 2017, para. 23 (“[I]f there is a power imbalance between the affected rights 
holders and a  given  enterprise  facing  allegations  of  human  rights  abuses, persons  administering a remedial 
mechanism should take proactive measures to redress this asymmetrical relationship.”); Judith Resnik, The Supreme 
Court 2010 Term: Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. 
Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) (discussing ways and struggles of courts to ease asymmetries of power and 
advance equal treatment before the law). 
 
 10 
Project could also help broaden and deepen understanding of whether, when, and how courts 
should and could be given a greater role in policing the conduct or outcomes of these arbitrations.32 
Domestic legal systems may be comfortable with limited judicial oversight of arbitration when the 
disputes being arbitrated are between two sophisticated businesses that are familiar with 
arbitration; but it is less clear that the same approach is appropriate for all BHR arbitration disputes. 
Relevant arbitration laws may need appropriate adjustments. A project cataloging such access-to-
justice barriers in arbitration agreements and arbitration laws, and helping victims and advocates 
overcome those barriers, would be an important contribution to efforts to help ensure arbitration 
improves, and does not undermine, access to justice for rights holders.    
Concluding Thoughts and Ways Forward 
 
At present, the Rules are described as providing “the possibility of a remedy for those affected by 
the human rights impacts of business activities, … serving as a non-State-based non-judicial 
grievance mechanism under Principle 31 of the UN Guiding Principles.”33 But the Project, in 
ignoring the ways in which companies have used legal tools to fight claims and thus impede access 
to remedy, has failed to adequately consider how the Rules might be used to further facilitate 
companies’ efforts to undermine access to justice, and how the Rules should thus be drafted to 
avoid such a situation. Arbitration is a system of high-party autonomy and delegated state power 
which can create risks for weaker parties, such as rights-holder claimants, yet the Rules pay 
inadequate attention to mechanisms for avoiding or correcting the abuses that can arise when 
entities are on vastly unequal footing. The limited and general guidance the Rules give tribunals 
to address inequalities of arms provides little assurance that tribunals will be willing and able to 
remedy either systemic or case-specific inequalities.  
 
These issues are part of the set of concerns we had identified in our previous submission to the 
Working Group based on the Elements Paper,34 and about which we remain concerned after having 
reviewed the Draft Rules.  
 
We reiterate our view that the objective of the Project—to identify and advance alternative 
remedies for victims of business-related rights abuses—is timely and critically important. But to 
serve potential rights-holder claimants, the perils of arbitration (and of the legal infrastructure that 
surrounds it) for rights holders should be recognized and addressed.  
 
As noted above, some of the major barriers to justice are barriers that companies have constructed 
and defended through lobbying and litigation. We thus reiterate that any efforts to encourage 
companies to ease these barriers by submitting to BHR Arbitration also be devoted to influencing 
corporations to stop undermining access to justice in domestic courts, including securing 
commitments from companies to: 
  
 waive forum non conveniens objections for certain types of human-rights related claims; 
                                                 
32 For some suggestions of greater involvement by courts in arbitration, see Shapiro, supra. 
33 BHR Arbitration Rules, Preamble.  
34 CCSI, Submission to the Drafting Team of the Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration (January 
31, 2019) < http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/02/21/business-and-human-rights-arbitration/>.  
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 agree to produce documents pertaining to the issue of parent company control relevant for 
establishing responsibility of the parent company for acts of its subsidiaries;  
 require their subsidiaries to waive jurisdictional objections to claims brought in the parent’s 
home country; 
 commit not to [re]structure for the purpose of judgment-proofing their assets;  
 commit not to engage in anti-SLAPP suits; and  
 agree to adhere to specified standards of responsible conduct in their business activities. 
 
Finally, we urge that the Project further open its process to pull in insights from rights holders, 
especially those currently plagued by access to justice challenges. While the Elements Paper and 
Draft Rules were open for public comment, we urge a more concerted effort to seek out, secure, 
and engage with input specifically from rights holders and their advocates. As the UN Working 
Group on Business and Human Rights has reiterated, “human rights are best advanced when the 
‘experiences, perspectives, interests, and opinions [of the rights holders]  deeply  inform  how  
remedy  mechanisms  are  created  and  implemented’.”35 The Working Group has further 
explained that rights holders  “should  be  consulted  meaningfully  in  creating, designing,  
reforming  and  operating  such  mechanisms.  Such engagement would ensure that remedial 
mechanisms and their processes are geared towards protecting and redressing the rights of 
communities affected by business-related human rights abuses.”36 While the BHR Arbitration 
Project has undertaken useful efforts to engage with a range of stakeholders, meaningful 
consultation of rights holders is not evident. An additional proactive effort to actively seek out and 
incorporate the perspectives of rights holders—including, for example, representatives of 
communities that have suffered adverse business impacts in the past, and that have attempted to 
seek remedy, as well as workers and indigenous peoples—and to audit each of the Rules from their 
perspective and based on their needs, would make it more likely that the Project does indeed result 
in a new mechanism that improves access to remedy for rights holders affected by business 
activity.  
 
                                                 
35 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, UN Doc. A/72/162, July 18, 2017, para. 21, quoting Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and 
Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, “Righting wrongs? Barrick Gold’s remedy mechanism for 
sexual violence in Papua New Guinea — key concerns and lessons learned” (2015), p. 44. 
36 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, UN Doc. A/72/162, July 18, 2017, at para. 22.  
